On 7 August 2024, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine registered the Draft Law on amendments to certain laws of Ukraine on ensuring the exercise of the right to acquire and retain Ukrainian citizenship (Reg. No. 11469).

On 17 December 2024, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the draft law in the first reading.

Earlier, the President of Ukraine had already submitted to the Parliament a draft law on certain issues in the field of migration regarding the grounds and procedure for acquiring and terminating Ukrainian citizenship (Reg. No. 10425), which was never submitted for consideration in the first reading. Instead, some of the provisions of Draft Law No. 11469 duplicate the provisions of Draft Law No. 10425.

In February 2024, the Coalition of Organisations already expressed warnings about the shortcomings of this draft law, emphasising the significant risks of violating citizenship rights for residents of the temporarily occupied territory (hereinafter — TOT) of Ukraine, stateless persons, their children, children of persons with complementary protection and children of asylum seekers in Ukraine. 

Draft Law No. 11469 proposes amendments to the Laws of Ukraine “On Citizenship of Ukraine”, “On Immigration”, “On the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons”, “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language”, which, as stated in the explanatory note, are aimed at improving the legal framework for the functioning of the citizenship institution in Ukraine, as well as ensuring the national interests of Ukraine in ensuring the exercise of the right to acquire and retain Ukrainian citizenship.

The aims and objectives of the draft law are to update the legal regulation of Ukrainian citizenship in view of the need to ensure national security and national interests of Ukraine, to preserve the unity of the Ukrainian community, and to reduce the negative consequences of the demographic crisis in Ukraine as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

Despite the importance of improving Ukraine’s citizenship legislation, the changes proposed by the draft law will have a direct negative impact on the possibility of acquiring Ukrainian citizenship for stateless persons and those at risk of statelessness, undocumented Ukrainian citizens from the TOT of Ukraine, refugees, persons in need of complementary protection, asylum seekers and their children. 

The text of the draft law as proposed creates unreasonable risks of deprivation of Ukrainian citizenship of persons residing in the TOT of Ukraine, given the targeted policy of the Russian Federation to impose Russian citizenship by denying access to basic vital services in the medical, social, educational and professional spheres, restricting freedom of movement, labour and property rights, denying humanitarian aid, depriving personal freedom, and forcible mobilisation. Below is a detailed description of the key risks contained in Draft Law No. 11469.

1. Unreasonable narrowing of the circle of persons who can acquire Ukrainian citizenship. Certain provisions of the draft law on acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship by birth and territorial origin narrow the circle of persons entitled to acquire citizenship under the current version of the Law. At the same time, the draft law does not contain any amendments to Article 7 of the Law of Ukraine “On Citizenship of Ukraine” that would guarantee the acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship by children born on the territory of Ukraine, if such children would otherwise become stateless.

At the same time, if the draft law is adopted, children of persons with complementary protection will lose the current opportunity and will not be able to acquire citizenship by birth (Article 7) and territorial origin (Article 8), as the category of “persons in need of complementary protection” is not included in the categories of persons “who have permanently resided on the territory of Ukraine” in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 10 of the draft law. Similarly, children of persons who have applied for recognition as refugees or persons in need of complementary protection in Ukraine (children of asylum seekers) may lose the right to acquire citizenship by territorial origin (Article 7), as their parents are not considered foreigners who have permanently resided in Ukraine in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 10, of the Draft.

In addition, Article 8 of the draft law provides for the possibility of acquiring Ukrainian citizenship by stateless persons by territorial origin only if they were born on the territory of Ukraine before 24 August 1991. Such amendments deprive persons of the right to acquire citizenship by territorial origin in case of their permanent residence, residence of their relatives in a certain territory that became the territory of Ukraine in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On the Succession of Ukraine”, or in other territories that were part of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Ukrainian State, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, Carpathian Ukraine, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) at the time of their birth or during their permanent residence.

The introduction of an examination on the fundamentals of the Constitution of Ukraine, the history of Ukraine and an examination to determine the level of proficiency in the state language, as well as the establishment of fees for passing the examinations, under Article 8 of the draft law, may significantly limit the possibility of stateless persons recognised under Article 6-1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons”, who are mostly from vulnerable categories of the population, often lack any education and are illiterate or have limited literacy skills.

If the draft is adopted, such proposals would violate the norms of international and national law of Ukraine.

In particular, in accordance with Article 22(3) of the Constitution of Ukraine, when adopting new laws or amending existing laws, it is not allowed to narrow the content and scope of existing rights and freedoms. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine in its Decision No. 5-р/2018 dated 22 May 2018 noted that in accordance with paragraph 1 of part one of Article 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine, human rights and freedoms and guarantees of these rights and freedoms are determined exclusively by the laws of Ukraine. However, in defining them, the legislator can only expand, not narrow, the content of constitutional rights and freedoms and establish mechanisms for their implementation. Therefore, the provisions of part three of Article 22 of the Constitution of Ukraine should be understood in such a way that when adopting new laws or amending existing laws, it is not allowed to narrow the content and scope of existing constitutional human rights and freedoms, if such narrowing leads to a violation of their essence.

According to Article 26 of the Constitution of Ukraine, foreigners and stateless persons legally residing in Ukraine enjoy the same rights and freedoms and bear the same responsibilities as citizens of Ukraine (with the exceptions established by the Constitution, laws or international treaties of Ukraine).

According to Article 1 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), which is part of the national legislation of Ukraine, a Contracting State shall confer its nationality on a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. 

According to Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), which is part of the national legislation of Ukraine, a child must be registered immediately after birth and from the moment of birth has the right to a name and to acquire a nationality, as well as, as far as possible, the right to know their parents and the right to their care. 

In September 2022, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child reiterated its recommendation given to Ukraine in 2011 regarding the need to amend citizenship legislation to simplify access to citizenship for children who would otherwise be stateless.

This recommendation has remained unimplemented by Ukraine for over a decade, as evidenced by the current version of Article 7 of the Law of Ukraine “On Citizenship of Ukraine”. The changes proposed by the draft law only complicate the access of children of stateless persons and children of asylum seekers to Ukrainian citizenship.

At the same time, one of the key recommendations of the Shadow report on Chapter 23 “Justice and Fundamental Rights” of the European Commission’s report on Ukraine in 2023 in the section “Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms” in the area of citizenship is to amend the Law of Ukraine “On Citizenship of Ukraine” to grant the right to acquire Ukrainian citizenship to all children born on the territory of Ukraine who do not acquire another citizenship at birth.

With regard to the right to acquire citizenship for children of asylum seekers, the courts have repeatedly found unlawful the inaction of the State Migration Service of Ukraine and its territorial units in proceedings on applications and submissions on Ukrainian citizenship from their parents (cases 640/25338/19, 640/15887/20, 320/12900/21).

Thus, the adoption of the draft law will lead to the loss of the current right to citizenship, which is currently enjoyed by certain categories of foreigners and stateless persons, as well as their children.

2. The grounds for refusal of Ukrainian citizenship violate the principle of legal certainty. The draft law proposes to abolish the grounds for refusal of Ukrainian citizenship, such as the commission of a crime against humanity or genocide, which seems at least unreasonable. Instead, it is proposed to define a person “who poses a threat to national interests, national security, protection of public order, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine” as not eligible for Ukrainian citizenship. This ground is formulated in violation of the principle of legal certainty, as neither the draft law nor the current legislation of Ukraine provides a definition of the concept of “a person who poses a threat to national interests, national security, protection of public order, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine”, nor does it establish criteria and evidence for the existence of such a “threat to national interests, national security, the protection of public order, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine”. This, in turn, creates a precondition for unlimited discretion in interpreting the grounds for denying an individual Ukrainian citizenship. 

In the Report of the Venice Commission No. 512/2009 “On the Rule of Law” (The Rule of Law Checklist), adopted at the 86th plenary session on 25-26 March 2011), the Venice Commission, outlining key aspects of the rule of law, concluded that decisions on legal rights should be based on clear and understandable rules of law, not on will or discretion. Thus, the lack of specification and assessment of such grounds for refusal of citizenship contradicts the rule of law principle enshrined in Article 8 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

3. Creating a threat of losing Ukrainian citizenship for Ukrainian citizens living in the TOT of Ukraine. Article 19 of the draft law expands the grounds for the loss of citizenship, in particular, the grounds for voluntary acquisition by a citizen of Ukraine of the citizenship of a state recognised by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor or occupying state, or citizenship (nationality) of a state not included in the list of states whose citizens (nationals) acquire Ukrainian citizenship under a simplified procedure, if at the time of such acquisition they have reached the age of majority. 

At the same time, the definition of the concept of voluntary acquisition of citizenship of another state as ‘all cases when a citizen of Ukraine, in order to acquire citizenship (nationality) of another state, had to submit an application or petition for such acquisition in accordance with the procedure established by the national legislation of the state whose citizenship (nationality) was acquired, except for the case provided for in part six of Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine”, as well as in the case of acquisition by a citizen of Ukraine who was illegally deported from the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine of the citizenship of a state recognised by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor or occupying state, does not take into account the interests of Ukrainian citizens who reside in the TOT of Ukraine and are forced to apply for the citizenship of the aggressor state in order to physically survive and exercise their rights and freedoms. 

First, this exception does not cover all practices of imposing Russian citizenship in the TOT of Ukraine. Thus, according to part six of Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine”, the forced automatic acquisition of Russian Federation citizenship by Ukrainian citizens residing in the temporarily occupied territory is not recognised by Ukraine and is not a ground for the loss of Ukrainian citizenship. At the same time, the concept of “forced automatic” acquisition of Russian citizenship is not defined by Ukrainian legislation. This creates a situation where this provision of the Law may apply to the non-recognition of citizenship obtained in the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea (where the imposition of citizenship by the Russian Federation took place in this manner), but does not actually cover the practice of forcing Russian citizenship in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which included the deportation of Ukrainian citizens to obtain Russian passports to the territory of the Russian Federation. 

Second, it is impossible to talk about the voluntary acquisition of Russian citizenship under occupation, when the aggressor country uses various means of intimidation and coercion to force Ukrainian citizens living in the TOT of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship. This includes restrictions on freedom of movement, access to humanitarian, social and medical assistance, deprivation of property ownership, and ultimately the threat of expulsion as a foreign citizen and/or deprivation of personal liberty. Such actions of the aggressor country constitute a violation of Article 45 IV of the Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex, which prohibits forcing the inhabitants of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the enemy state. This prohibition covers both the military oath and the transfer of citizenship. Despite the fact that the Russian Federation tries to imitate the voluntary nature of citizenship acquisition by maintaining formal procedures (e.g., by requiring an application, sometimes by recording the recitation of the Russian oath), these procedures have nothing to do with procedures designed to ensure the exercise of the right to voluntary acquisition of citizenship. Therefore, the submission of an application for a passport cannot be a sign of the voluntary nature of the acquisition of Russian citizenship in the TOT of Ukraine, even if it occurred with the submission of an application.

Therefore, the second paragraph of part 1 of Article 19 of the draft law, which defines the circumstances under which citizenship is not considered voluntary, needs to be clarified to state that citizenship acquired in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine is not considered voluntary, as well as the acquisition by a citizen of Ukraine, who was illegally deported from the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, of the citizenship of a state recognised by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor or occupying state, except in cases where the acquisition of the citizenship of a state recognised by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor or occupying state is used for the purpose of propaganda of war, public support of armed aggression against Ukraine, as well as in cases where such a person terminates the citizenship of Ukraine in accordance with the procedure established by this Law. 

Another rather dubious ground for deprivation of Ukrainian citizenship is “the use of a foreigner’s passport on the territory of Ukraine by an adult citizen of Ukraine who has citizenship (nationality) of a foreign state, which results in threats to national security and/or national interests of Ukraine”. The grounds formulated in this way contradict the principle of legal certainty, as the draft law does not define the criteria and circumstances under which the use of a passport document may endanger the national security and/or national interests of Ukraine, which in turn is a precondition for unreasonable discretion and creates a risk of unreasonable deprivation of citizenship.

Similarly, in terms of the grounds for the loss of Ukrainian citizenship, the draft law proposes to establish that such grounds include, in particular, “the entry into force of a court verdict of guilty against persons convicted in Ukraine for committing a crime against the foundations of national security of Ukraine”. Thus, the draft law actually establishes an additional punishment for committing a crime under the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter — the CCU), which violates the requirements of part three of Article 3 of the CCU, according to which the criminal unlawfulness of an act, as well as its punishability and other criminal law consequences, are determined only by this Code. 

The draft law also lists as an additional ground for deprivation of Ukrainian citizenship the participation of a Ukrainian citizen in armed aggression against Ukraine as part of the armed forces of a state recognised by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor or occupying state, or which is in an armed conflict (war) with Ukraine or has contributed to the commission of armed aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, such a formulation of the grounds for deprivation of citizenship does not take into account the circumstances of Russia’s systematic violation of international humanitarian law, which, among other things, includes the use of coercion against Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territory to perform military service and/or forced mobilisation into armed formations, in particular through coercion to sign a contract to create the illusion of “voluntariness”. Persons who joined such groups under coercion are victims of an international crime. Only the voluntary participation of Ukrainian citizens in such armed groups, proven in court, should be considered a ground for the loss of Ukrainian citizenship.

4. Disproportionate restrictions on immigration permits outside the quota. The amendments to the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Immigration’ proposed by the draft law stipulate that an immigration permit outside the quota is granted to one of the spouses if the other spouse is a deceased citizen of Ukraine, a member of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations established in accordance with the laws of Ukraine and special purpose law enforcement agencies, the State Transport Special Service, the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (regardless of the length of marriage valid at the time of death) — in case of applying for an immigration permit during martial law or no later than within 6 months from the date of its termination or cancellation.

Thus, the proposed wording leaves out children/parents of deceased (fallen) military personnel, despite the fact that they all belong to relatives of the first degree of kinship, and therefore, their non-inclusion in the list creates conditions of uncertainty in the legal status of these categories of persons on the territory of Ukraine. At the same time, taking into account the intensity of the military operations taking place on the territory of Ukraine, we believe that a permit for immigration outside the quota should also be granted to a spouse/children/parents if a citizen of Ukraine is declared missing or deceased by a court. It should be noted that the categories of military personnel whose death gives rise to the possibility of immigration outside the quota do not include members of the National Guard of Ukraine, which is inconsistent with the provisions of paragraphs 9, 10 of part 2 of Article 4 of the Law “On Immigration”, which provide enhanced legal protection to this category of persons.

In addition to these risks, it is worth noting that the draft law proposes to supplement Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine “On Citizenship of Ukraine” with a new principle “determining the legal regime of simultaneous citizenship (nationality) of two or more states, taking into account the national security and national interests of Ukraine”. This principle of “multiple citizenship” is not consistent with the principle of single citizenship provided for in paragraph 1 of part 1 of Article 2 of the Law “On Citizenship of Ukraine”, which is not changed by the draft law.

In order to achieve legal certainty and avoid legal conflicts, it is advisable to harmonise these principles and determine how the new approach of “multiple citizenship” will be implemented in the context of Ukraine’s current citizenship legislation. 

After the draft law passed the first reading, a significant number of amendments were submitted to it, including those that raise reasonable doubts about their expediency and validity.  

Thus, the responsible Committee received proposals to supplement the draft law with provisions restricting the rights to hold certain positions in state authorities, local self-government bodies, and to carry out independent professional activities for persons holding the citizenship of the aggressor state or a state that does not recognise the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine or the illegality of encroachments on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, in particular voted against the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine and/or voted against at least one of the Resolutions of the Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine under the Uniting for Peace mechanism. It is also proposed that the law may establish other restrictions on the rights of mentioned persons.

The proposed approach to restricting the rights of citizens depending on their citizenship (nationality) of certain countries is unreasonable, contradicts the principle of equality of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens (Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine), as it unreasonably shifts the responsibility for voting against the UN General Assembly Resolutions of certain states to their citizens (nationals) who do not participate in the adoption of these political decisions.

Taking into account these shortcomings, the Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Ensuring the Exercise of the Right to Acquire and Retain Ukrainian Citizenship (Reg. No. 11469) needs to be significantly revised. 

If adopted in its current version, the draft law will create significant risks of violations of citizenship rights for residents of the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, as well as stateless persons, persons in need of complementary protection, their children and children of asylum seekers in Ukraine.

14 February 2025 

Civil Holding GROUP OF INFLUENCE

CF Right to Protection

Human Rights Centre ZMINA

NGO CrimeaSOS

CF EAST-SOS

Crimean Human Rights Group

NGO Donbas SOS

CO CF Stabilization Support Services

Since the beginning of the occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine, the Rus- sian Federation (hereinafter – the RF) has used different approaches to the extension of its legislation to the occupied territories: either immediately illegally extended its legislation to this territory, as happened with the temporarily occupied territory (hereinafter – TOT) of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in 2014; or, as in the sit- uation with the TOT of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, exercised control over these territo- ries through its occupation administrations without incorporating these territories in its territory. However, since September 2022, following the unlawful incorporation of parts of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kherson regions into the RF and the adoption of these provisions into the RF Constitution, all legislation of the aggressor country has been ap- plied equally to all TOT of Ukraine.

Russia’s violation of key norms of international humanitarian law (hereinafter – IHL) is the root of all subsequent problems. Despite the fact that war is a prohibited instru- ment of international relations, wars do take place. According to IHL, military occupation as a consequence of war must be a temporary factual situation. Occupation cannot lead to a transfer of sovereignty from the state whose territory is occupied to the occupying state1. For this reason, the occupying state is obliged to respect the legislation of the occupied state to the maximum extent possible. However, it seems that Russia did not initially consider the occupation of Ukrainian territories as temporary.

Therefore, all documents issued in the TOT of Ukraine – from child birth certificates to permits – are issued either in accordance with the legislation of the RF or in accord- ance with the “legislation” of the so-called DPR/LPR2. Ukraine recognises such actions of the occupying power as unlawful. According to Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine “On Ensur- ing the Rights and Freedoms and Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine”, any act (decision, document) issued by illegal authorities and/or persons in the TOT of Ukraine is invalid and does not create legal consequences. The only exceptions are documents confirming the fact of birth, death, marriage or divorce of a person in the TOT of Ukraine, but even these documents (specifically, only a part of them – birth and death certificates) are subject to a judicial procedure that precedes the issuance of Ukrainian state-issued documents.

Civil status acts are just one example of the state’s approach to documents issued to Ukrainian citizens under the occupation. Over the years of occupation, millions of different documents have been issued in the TOT of Ukraine, which are recognised as invalid by the state of Ukraine. However, the question arises as to what consequences this invalidity will have in the context of the reintegration of the deoccupied territories? What are the possible approaches to taking into account information from documents issued by the occupation authorities? Should approaches differ depending on the nature and type of documents and the legal consequences they entail? What documents can be subject to an exclusively judicial procedure due to the significance of the legal consequences or other reasons? And what documents can be issued by administrative procedure?

The issue of recognition of documents issued by the occupying power has been considered in other contexts, in particular, in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the case of Legal Consequences for States of the Continuing Presence of South Africa in Namibia (1971). The Court enshrined the so-called “Namibian exceptions”3, which are referred to in their decisions by both the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Ukrainian courts. According to the above-mentioned ICJ opinion, documents issued by the occupying authorities should be taken into account if their disregard entails serious violations or restrictions on the rights of citizens. Recognition of these facts does not lead to recognition of the occupying authorities and the documents issued by them. Instead, it helps to avoid situations of complete lawlessness for people living in the occupied territories and contributes to their protection in their own country and other countries of the world.

This analytical note is, in fact, the first attempt to define the list of documents issued by the occupation authorities, and the information from which can be used by the state authorities of Ukraine in a certain order to minimise the negative consequences of the occupation for a significant part of the population of Ukraine living under occupation. The document lists the key categories of documents issued by the occupation authorities in the TOT of Ukraine, which are critical for the exercise of the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens, and for which it is possible to determine the mechanisms and procedures for taking them into account when issuing the relevant state-issued documents. This list is not exhaustive, but gives an idea of the scope of the problems faced by Ukrainian citizens living in the TOT of Ukraine and the tasks that the state faces.

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The armed aggression of the Russian Federation, which began with the occupation of Crimea in February 2014, has led to massive destruction and killing, injuries to hundreds of thousands of people, and the displacement of millions of Ukrainians both inside and outside the country. Parts of the Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Donetsk, Luhansk regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol remain under occupation. Overcoming the consequences of hostilities, shelling of Ukrainian settlements and energy infrastructure, which are continuing in 2025, requires further joint action by the state, civil society, and inter- national partners. Despite the fact that the size of the temporarily occupied territories (hereinafter – TOT) of Ukraine is increasing every day, the state should continue to build policies aimed at supporting and stimulating ties with the residents of the TOT of Ukraine.

We, the representatives of the coalition of organisations dealing with the protection of the rights of victims of armed aggression against Ukraine1, have a consolidated position on the priority steps of the state to protect human rights in 2025. Implementation of the follow- ing recommendations will ensure a consistent state policy towards victims of war, promote justice, and ensure predictability of the state’s actions towards those affected by the armed aggression against Ukraine.

TO THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE:

1.Harmonize national criminal law with international law. On 24 August 2024, Ukraine ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter – the ICC), and on 22 October 2024, the implementing law was signed, which began the process of harmonising Ukrainian criminal law with international law. Thus, the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter – the CCU) was supplemented by Article 442-1 (“Crimes against humanity”), Article 438 was renamed (from “Violation of the laws and customs of war” to “War crimes”), and the new Article 31-1 provides for the liability of military commanders. However, the amendments are not sufficient. In particular, the article on the crime of aggression changed only the name, but the crime remained much broader than the Rome Statute of the ICC. The situation is similar to Article 438 of the CCU – the title “war crimes” does not correspond to the article’s content, which includes violations of international humanitarian law (hereinafter – IHL) in general, not just gross violations. The introduction of a new Article 442-1 of the CCU, which provides for liability for crimes against humanity, leaves the issue of the time lim- it for this provision unresolved. The main objectives of further amendments to criminal law should be to include proper definitions of crimes, to provide for liability for both war crimes, with clearly defined elements of certain crimes, and for non-gross violations of IHL, and to resolve the issue of the application of Article 442-1 of the CCU in time. It is also important that any further changes do not jeopardise the work with the initiated criminal proceedings, which already number more than 150,000.

2. Ensure the protection of Ukrainian citizens living in the TOT of Ukraine from 2 the risk of losing their citizenship. On 17 December 2024, the Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Ensuring the Exercise of the Right to Acquire and Retain Ukrainian Citizenship” (No. 11469 of 07.08.2024) was adopted in the first reading. This draft law, among other things, contains a list of grounds for the loss of Ukrainian citizenship. These grounds include the voluntary acquisition of the cit- izenship of the aggressor country, with the submission of a passport application being considered evidence of voluntariness. The draft law also contains other grounds, such as participation in armed aggression against Ukraine as part of the armed forces of the aggressor state. However, taking into account Russia’s policy towards the TOT of Ukraine and the imposition of Russian citizenship as a targeted policy of the Russian Federation, it is important to prevent the emergence of a rule in Ukrainian legislation that will put millions of Ukrainian citizens under occupation at risk of losing Ukrainian citizenship. It is also worth considering that the Russian Federation violates IHL by forcing Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territory to swear allegiance and commits an international crime by forcing Ukrainians to serve in the armed forces and/or mobilise them into the ranks of its armed forces, in particular by forcing them to sign a contract to create the illusion of “voluntariness”.

3. Identify mechanisms for using information from documents issued under occupation. In accordance with the approach established in Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring Rights and Freedoms and Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine” back in 2014, any documents issued during the occupation are invalid and do not create legal consequences. The only exceptions are documents confirming the fact of birth, death, and registration (dissolution) of marriage in the TOT of Ukraine, which should be attached to the application for state registration of the relevant civil status act. However, as of the beginning of 2025, Ukraine has not introduced such a procedure for civil status acts. Instead, there is a judicial procedure that applies only to births and deaths that occurred under occupation, and it is not effective and does not facilitate state registration of relevant acts. For example, in 2022-2023, only about 8,000 children from the TOT of Ukraine received a Ukrainian birth certificate, although the estimated number of births in the TOT of Ukraine during this period was 72,000. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has registered a government draft law No. 9069, which introduces an administrative procedure for the recognition of civil status acts that took place in the TOT of Ukraine. Its adoption would allow citizens who lived or are still living under occupation to obtain Ukrainian documents and ensure access to the exercise of their rights. As of 1 January 2025, the draft law has not been adopted. At the same time, civil status acts are not the only documents issued in the TOT of Ukraine that have a significant impact on the ability to exercise the rights of adults and children now and after de-occupation. These documents include medical documents, property documents, court decisions, etc. The state should reconsider its approach to the complete non-recognition of documents issued during the occupation and develop and implement mechanisms for using information from certain types of such documents.

4. Ensure the proper functioning of mechanisms for accounting and compensation for destroyed or damaged movable and immovable property as a result of armed aggression against Ukraine. Introduced in February 2023 by Law of Ukraine No. 2923-IX, the mechanism of compensation for damage and destruction of real estate as a result of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated several systemic problems and shortcomings that require attention and comprehensive solutions from the state. The approach that prevents homeowners from receiving compensation for housing destroyed or damaged before 24 February 2022, or located in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine as of that date, is discriminatory. Draft law No. 11161, adopted by the Parliament on 19 December 2024, provides for the possibility of receiving compensation for real estate located in the area of hostilities or in the TOT of Ukraine, which, for compensation purposes are equated to destroyed, and is also limited to the period after 24 February 2022. At the same time, access to the compensation procedure is significantly restricted for owners of destroyed or damaged real estate, the ownership of which is not recorded in the State Register of Real Property Rights. It is impossible to enter information on the basis of paper documents on the ownership of such properties that arose before 1 January 2013, due to the destruction of and loss of ac- cess to the archives of the Bureau of Technical Inventory (hereinafter – BTI). Despite an important legislative initiative aimed at simplifying the procedure for state registration of ownership of real estate in the absence of access to the materials of BTI enterprises (draft law No. 11440), the judicial procedure for confirming ownership of real estate that was destroyed or damaged as a result of Russia’s armed aggression also needs to be simplified. Currently, owners are forced to go to court to obtain the right to compensation, incurring significant legal costs in a lengthy court procedure.

5. Amend the CCU to ensure compliance with the principle of legal certainty in the issue of bringing to justice for collaborative activities. In the spring of 2022, the CCU was supplemented with new offences: “collaborative activity” (Article 111-1) and “aiding and abetting the aggressor state” (Article 111-2). An analysis of the practice of applying these provisions shows that the current wording creates the basis for excessive discretion of law enforcement officers in qualifying acts and misunderstanding by citizens of the limits of permissible activities in the occupied territory. In addition, the broad wording leads to the prosecution of persons who are considered to be providing vital functions in the occupied territory under IHL. Since March 2022, 18 draft laws have been submitted to parliament that provide for amendments to Article 111-1 of the CCU or address the issue of restricting the rights of those accused of collaborationism, which is evidence of the imperfection and need to revise the law. Despite the importance of making changes and numerous reports by international organisations, there has been no thorough discussion of this issue in parliament. In addition to clarifying the wording of Article 111-1 of the CCU, consideration should be given to removing the least serious category of violations from the criminal justice system and ensuring lustration measures, as well as considering the possibility of developing amnesty legislation.

6. Adopt comprehensive amendments to legislation to ensure the rights of IDPs. In order to effectively ensure the development of the state policy on internal displacement, taking into account the challenges posed by the full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine, it is necessary to adopt a new version of the Law of Ukraine “On En- suring the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons”, the relevant draft law has been registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (No. 12301). The draft law, among other things, provides for the introduction of a mandatory assessment of the needs of IDPs at different stages of displacement to determine the scope of additional guarantees provided to a person, including financial assistance in the form of housing support, social and pension payments to IDPs on a general basis regardless of the date of dis- placement, and state support measures at different stages of displacement. The need to revise the relevant legislation is also justified by the need to prevent disproportionate and unlawful restrictions on the rights of IDPs. The most recent example of such a lim- itation is Article 40 of the Law of Ukraine “On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2025”, which stipulates that funds deposited in IDP accounts must be returned to the Pension Fund of Ukraine if these funds are not used for more than one year. This action of the state can be qualified as an illegal deprivation of property rights of IDPs and needs to be eliminated, taking into account the arguments set out in the Coalition’s Position before the draft amendments.

TO THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF UKRAINE:

7. Prioritise the reintegration of residents of the TOT of Ukraine and support for IDPs and other people affected by the armed aggression against Ukraine. In December 2024, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine (hereinafter – the Ministry of Reintegration) was renamed into the Ministry of National Unity of Ukraine, and the powers concerning the TOT of Ukraine, IDPs, deportees, persons deprived of their personal liberty as a result of armed aggression against Ukraine were transferred to the Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine (hereinafter – the Ministry of Development). Since September 2024, when information about the possible liquidation of the Ministry of Reintegration first appeared, the government’s activities to protect and support these categories of survivors, for whom the Ministry of Reintegration was considered to be the main agency, have been “put on hold”. In particular, the drafts of several strategies – on ensuring the housing rights of IDPs in Ukraine, IDP employment, restoration of state authority in the de-occupied territories, and reintegration – are not being finalised and approved. The final determination of the responsible ministry (Ministry of Development) should create conditions where representation and protection of the rights and interests of a large number of affected persons and reintegration issues will again become a priority for the Government of Ukraine, including taking into account existing developments and ensuring the preservation of institutional memory. The Ministry of Development should coordinate the policies of other ministries and agencies to ensure the implementation of the pow- ers transferred to it as a result of the reorganisation of the Ministry of Reintegration.
Although the development and implementation of certain policies seem to be a task that does not fit into the logic of the Ministry of Development, these powers transferred from the Ministry of Reintegration should be fully implemented in partnership with civil society organisations and international partners. The Ministry of Development, in turn, needs to strengthen its structure in connection with the powers granted to it.

8. Introduce a comprehensive system of support for people affected by the armed aggression against Ukraine. On 20 November 2024, the Law of Ukraine “On Accounting for Information on Damage to Personal Property Rights of Individuals as a Result of the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine” No. 4071-IX was adopted, the transitional provisions of which stipulate that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine must develop and submit to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine a draft law on support for persons whose personal property rights were damaged as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine within one month from the date of publication of this law (18.12.2024). Part 4 of Article 10 of this Law also stipulates that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is responsible for defining the categories of affected persons, which is an important step towards ensuring a unified, fair and sustainable approach to protecting the rights of such persons. More than a decade after the start of the armed aggression, the national legislation of Ukraine does not define the categories of persons who are affected persons, and there is no comprehensive and holistic system of support for affected persons. Moreover, persons who have suffered harm to their lives and health, in particular as a result of war crimes, remain without adequate support from the state. On 20 November 2024, Law of Ukraine No. 4067-IX was also adopted, which introduced the institution of urgent interim reparations, including the provision of urgent financial assistance to individuals affected by sexual violence related to the armed aggression against Ukraine. It is advisable that such support be provided to other individuals among those who suffered the most severe and multiple harm as a result of the armed aggression against Ukraine.

9. Ensure the exercise of rights and protection of interests of persons who have 9 been deprived of their personal liberty as a result of armed aggression against Ukraine. As of January 2025, according to human rights organisations, the Russian authorities are holding at least 220 Ukrainian citizens in detention facilities in the occupied Crimea and the Russian Federation for political reasons. In addition, the number of civilians deprived of their liberty after 24 February 2022, continues to grow. According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, the number of civilians in Russian captivity is over 10,000. As a result of governmental changes, the Ministry of Development has been entrusted with measures to ensure the rights and interests of persons deprived of their liberty as a result of armed aggression and their family members. Consequently, the relevant Interagency Commission on establishing the fact of deprivation of personal liberty as a result of armed aggression against Ukraine will also function on the basis of the Ministry of Development. At the same time, it is advisable to consider the possibility of ensuring the functioning of the commission on the basis of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, which is already responsible for establishing the fact of belonging to several categories of affected persons of armed aggression against Ukraine. In addition, based on an analysis of the practice of applying the Law of Ukraine “On Social and Legal Protection of Persons Deprived of Personal Liberty as a Result of Armed Aggression against Ukraine and Members of Their Families”, it is important to develop and submit to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine amendments to the relevant Law, as well as to Government Resolutions No. 1210 dated 28 October 2022, and No. 296 dated 15 March 2024, to provide civilians released from captivity with adequate medical and rehabilitation assistance, temporary housing, adaptation measures, etc.

10. Support children and young people from the TOT of Ukraine, in particular by creating conditions for education. The state should introduce support programmes for children and young people to facilitate their adaptation and integration after leaving the TOT of Ukraine, including education. For example, these could be short-term integration programmes similar to the preparatory course with scholarships implemented by the Ministry of Reintegration in 2021. Programmes to support children and youth from the TOT of Ukraine, as well as creating conditions for them to receive Ukrainian edu- cation, will ensure that those under occupation maintain ties with the state of Ukraine. In the field of education, the Government should ensure the conditions for obtaining education through various forms: distance/individual forms in accordance with a stand- ard educational programme adapted to the needs of children from the TOT of Ukraine, or individual forms to prepare for the state final attestation. Educational and model programmes should be adapted, taking into account the existing educational losses of children, the limited time for learning materials, the need to build civic resistance to propaganda, etc. It is important to note that some of the schools that have been operating in the TOT of Ukraine since 24 February 2022, have been displaced and are providing education remotely for both displaced children (within the state and abroad) and those in the TOT. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine should transform the educational centres “Crimea-Ukraine” and “Donbas-Ukraine” into a single educational centre and ensure a timely information campaign aimed at increasing the number of applicants. The Procedure for the Recognition of Learning Outcomes at the Levels of Vocational (Vocational and Technical), Professional Pre-Higher and Higher Education should be approved and implemented in accordance with the final provisions of Law of Ukraine No. 3482-IX, which is a positive step by the state. The adoption of the bylaws will create an opportunity for children from the TOT to receive Ukrainian education, and for young people, in addition to the possibility of continuing their education, it will also provide access to the Ukrainian labour market, which is essential in the context of a staff shortage.

11. Ensure payment of pensions to IDPs without discrimination. IDP pensioners are completely dependent on their pensions, which are mostly the only source of their livelihood. To ensure full provision of pensions to IDPs, it is necessary to eliminate dis- crimination against IDPs who moved before 24 February 2022, and to simplify the mechanism for renewing and paying pensions to Ukrainian citizens living in the TOT of Ukraine. Since 2014, the Ukrainian government has applied different approaches to pension payments for IDPs and other citizens of Ukraine living in the government-controlled areas. Additional restrictive requirements were introduced for IDPs (e.g., they must have a certificate of IDP registration, undergo periodic identification, and use only one bank – JSC Oschadbank). These discriminatory restrictions and additional requirements continue to apply to those who moved before 24 February 2022. On the other hand, persons displaced after 24 February 2022, receive their pensions under general conditions. In this regard, there is a need to eliminate discrimination, namely to repeal CMU Resolution No. 637 and equally regulate the procedure for receiving pensions for IDPs, including those who have left and are abroad. In addition, citizens of Ukraine living in the territories occupied before 24 February 2022, cannot resume pension payments remotely in case of termination, as the current legislation requires a person to apply to the PFU in person. Law of Ukraine No. 3674-IX was intended to simplify the mechanism of receiving pensions by Ukrainian citizens who live in the TOT of Ukraine or who moved to the government-controlled territory during the temporary occupation. Instead, the Ministry of Social Policy has not developed a mechanism for implementing this law, making it impossible to implement it.

12. Ensure the creation of accommodation facilities for evacuated people with reduced mobility (including people with disabilities and the elderly). During the large-scale armed aggression against Ukraine, the issue of creating conditions for the evacuation of civilians from the territories of hostilities and nearby areas, as well as from the TOT of Ukraine, became more relevant. Civil society organisations assumed responsibility for the evacuation of certain categories of the population in a situation where the state could not effectively cope with this task. However, in addition to evacuation, there is an important problem of accommodation of the evacuated population. Currently, NGOs are exhausting their resources to find and prepare premises and further accommodate evacuated persons with disabilities and the elderly. The regional military administrations answer that the region is either running out of places or has no places. The Strategy for the Reform of Psychoneurological, Residential Institutions and Deinstitutionalisation of Care for People with Disabilities and the Elderly, adopted on 24 December 2024, fails to answer the question of what to do with the large number of evacuees in need of inpatient care. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a solution for the period of martial law to address the problem of accommodating a large number of evacuees in need of residential care. For example, the creation of additional places of temporary residence with inpatient care.

13. Define the general vision of the state regarding the TOT of Ukraine and support for people living there. The Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” defines the specifics of state policy to ensure Ukraine’s state sovereignty in the TOT of Ukraine. However, after more than a decade of armed aggression, there is a lack of a common vision of the state’s vision for the TOT of Ukraine, which will be consistently followed in the actions of the state authorities. Analysing state policy documents and draft laws registered in the parliament, it can be stated that the lack of a clear understanding of the vision of the future of the TOT of Ukraine and their residents, unpredictability and reactionary nature of legislative acts supported by the parliament pose threats to the preservation of ties between Ukrainians under occupation and the state. The weakening or severance of these ties is the result of Russia’s deliberate policy. Therefore, Ukraine should take all possible steps to strengthen ties with those citizens living in the TOT of Ukraine. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of the consequences of the long-lasting occupation of part of Ukraine’s territory, in particular the more than ten-year occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Ukraine has been in a state of armed aggression by the Russian Federation for more than a decade. Crimea and parts of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kherson regions have been occupied by the aggressor country for a long time. However, these Ukrainian territories continue to be home to Ukrainian citizens who demonstrate resilience and faith in liberation every day despite the occupation. 

We, the representatives of the coalition of organizations dealing with the protection of the rights of victims of armed aggression against Ukraine, stress the importance of the state’s actions aimed at ensuring and maintaining the national unity of Ukrainian society. The state should continue to work to strengthen ties with those Ukrainian citizens who live in the temporarily occupied territories (TOT).

We are convinced that the state must take direct steps to support our people who remain under occupation and to build ties with them. In particular: 

• there should be in the Government of Ukraine responsible for the development and implementation of state policy on the temporarily occupied territories, support and reintegration of their residents. This institution should have all the necessary resources (human, material, etc.) to carry out its functions;
• support programmes should be developed and implemented for children and youth leaving the TOT; such support should include assistance in obtaining passport documents, providing temporary accommodation, access to education, psychological assistance, financial support, etc;
• mechanisms should be developed to use information from documents issued by the occupation authorities to avoid negative consequences for the civilian population and to ensure their rights in the territory controlled by Ukraine. First of all, it is necessary to introduce extrajudicial procedures for the use of information from civil status acts, medical documents, property documents, etc;
• the state policy on internally displaced persons should remain consistent, predictable and should include real support measures based on an assessment of the needs of IDPs. 

Ukrainian society must support the resilience of Ukrainian people under occupation and provide our citizens with comprehensive support. The voice of our country must be more powerful than the propaganda of the RF. Our right to the sovereign territories of Ukraine only grows stronger when Ukrainian citizens are waiting for us on these territories.

While the territories are occupied, there are still people living there.

December 13, 2024

NGO Civil Holding GROUP OF INFLUENCE

Human Rights Centre ZMINA

CO CF Stabilisation Support Services

CF Right to Protection

CF EAST SOS

NGO CrimeaSOS

NGO Donbas SOS

Crimean Human Rights Group

We, the representatives of organisations dealing with the protection of the rights of victims of armed aggression against Ukraine, support the decision to retain the ministry responsible for people affected by the war and to transform the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories into the Ministry of National Unity. This important decision sends a clear signal to our fellow citizens, international partners and civil society that overcoming the negative consequences of the war and national unity are a priority for the state policy of Ukraine.

In September 2024, together with more than 50 organisations, we called on the President of Ukraine to support the preservation of the government ministry responsible for people affected by the war, regardless of whether they are in the temporarily occupied or government-controlled areas of Ukraine or abroad. The President spoke about this in October 2019, during the Unity Forum event in Mariupol. A person, along with their rights and needs, must remain at the center of the state’s attention, especially if they have suffered as a result of the armed aggression of the RF.

We are convinced that national unity is only possible when the state works on social cohesion, starting with communities in government-controlled areas and ending with facilitating the return of Ukrainians who were forced to go abroad due to the war. However, it is equally important to maintain and build ties with the residents of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. We don’t know when our lands will be liberated, but the people who remain there are citizens of Ukraine and our strongest link to the territories temporarily controlled by the aggressor state. Our people under occupation need support from their own state and consideration of their interests and needs in the development of state policies.

We believe that the priority of the Ministry of National Unity should be to maintain ties with those with whom the state is forced to lose these ties because of the war. Therefore, the human dimension should be the key focus for the renewed ministry.  As well as the Ministry of Reintegration, the Ministry of National Unity should continue to ensure the formation and implementation of state policy on:

• the temporarily occupied territories and protection of the rights of the population living there, with the goal of their reintegration into a single legal, informational, socio-economic, cultural, and educational space of Ukraine; 
• internally displaced persons and citizens of Ukraine who were forced to go abroad regarding the facilitation of the exercise of their rights and freedoms and the creation of conditions for voluntary return or integration at a new place of residence; 
• social cohesion and the building of a long-term just peace.

We call on the government of Ukraine to be guided by the idea that national unity and resilience are one of the necessary conditions for the return of the territories occupied by the enemy when determining the scope of the Ministry of National Unity. National unity cannot be achieved without considering the interests and needs of the millions of citizens affected by the war, including those who remain in the temporarily occupied territories. 

December 6, 2024

Human Rights Centre ZMINA

NGO Donbas SOS

NGO Civil Holding GROUP OF INFLUENCE

Crimean Human Rights Group

CF EAST-SOS

CO CF Stabilization Support Services

NGO CrimeaSOS

CF Right to Protection

Dear Volodymyr Oleksnadrovych,

We, representatives of civil society, show you our respect and gratitude for the firm commitment to Ukraine’s integration into the EU democratic space, reform of local self-government, support for the development of democracy, and the strengthening of civic engagement.

Since 2014, the civil society sector has been raising concerns over restrictions on access of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to tools of local democracy. Some local self-government bodies provided for the possibility of those who do not have a registered place of residence in communities to use particular tools of civic engagement. Along with that, certain restrictions are still in place at the national level, which prevents IDPs from fully integrating and participating in local governance.

On 9 May 2024, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Democracy at the Level of Local Self-Government” (reg. No. 7283) by 317 votes. The Law is geared towards making citizens engaged in activities of local self-government bodies through advisory tools and bringing the legislation in line with the Recommendations of the Council of Europe. In the 2024 plan of reforms by the Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine, the draft Law No. 7283 was seen as important for the support and development of communities and territories.

Key novelties of the Law:

• mandatory approval of charters of territorial communities by local councils,
• integration of internally displaced persons into host communities,
• stronger engagement of youth and civil society organisations in decision-making in communities,
• detailed procedure for holding general meetings, public hearings, public evaluation, introduction of local initiatives,
• definition for “resident” and opportunity for residents to participate in local budgeting,
• improvement of procedures for reporting by community leaders and members of local councils.

We ask you to urgently sign the Law of Ukraine No. 3703-ІХ “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Democracy at the Level of Local Self-Government” adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (reg. No. 7283).

We believe that the entry into force of this Law will help ensure a transparent and accountable system of governance at the community level, especially in the context of the country’s recovery when joint efforts and trust between the public and authorities are crucial. An increase in joint accountability of citizens and local authorities, as provided for by this Law, will help engage communities in making decisions that directly affect their territories and ensure sustainable development.

Non-governmental organisations:

1. NGO Civil Holding “GROUP OF INFLUENCE”
2. NGO “Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research”
3. CF Kherson Community Foundation “Zakhyst”
4. Human Rights Centre ZMINA
5. Crimean Human Rights Group
6. NGO “Donbas SOS”
7. NGO “Volyn Institute of Law”
8. NGO” Association for Support and Development of Association of Co-Owners of Apartment Buildings and Bodies of Self-Organisation of Population”
9. CF “EAST SOS”
10. NGO “Center for Social Development and Initiatives”
11. NGO “Access Point”
12. NGO “Spilno HUB”
13. CF “Stabilization Support Services”
14. NGO Center “Dobrochyn”
15. NGO “Chernihiv Center for Human Rights”
16. NGO “Brainstorm”
17. NGO “Youth Debate Federation of Ukraine”
18. NGO “Modern Format”
19. NGO “CrimeaSOS”
20. NGO “Kryvyi Rih Egida-Center”
21. NGO “Donetsk Institute for Social Research and Political Analysis”
22. NGO “MART”
23. Association “Civic Initiatives of Ukraine”
24. CO ICF “Nova Kakhovka Is Ukraine”
25. CO CF “LASKA”
26. NGO IDP Organization “Needed People”
27. NGO “Vinnytsia Press Club”
28. NGO “Lion’s Society”
29. NGO “Nashe Podillia”
30. NGO “Network of Civil Society Hubs of Ukraine”
31. NGO Center for Civic and Cultural Initiatives Support “Tamarisk”
32. NGO Centre “Women’s Perspectives”
33. NGO Kremenchuk Informative-Elucidative Center “European Club”
34. NGO “Alternative”
35. NGO “Academy of Strategic Studies”
36. NGO Center for Civic and Cultural Initiatives Support “Tamarisk”
37. NGO Sustainable Development Agency “Skyscraper”
38. NGO “Territory of Success”
39. CF “Right to Protection”
40. Chernivtsi Regional NGO “Committee of Voters”
41. Centre of Public Initiatives “Ideas for Change”
42. NGO “Bukovyna Center for Election Technologies”
43. NGO Veteran’s Hub “Unbreakable”
44. Civil Network OPORA
45. Ukrainian Child Rights Network
46. NGO “Institute Respublica”
47. Kamianets-Podilskyi Association of “Prosvita” Society named after Taras Shevchenko
48. All-Ukrainian Initiative “Active Community”
49. Active Community Initiative
50. NGO “Zhytomyr Volunteer Headquarters”
51. NGO “Mega Society”
52. NGO “Pivnichna Horlytsia”
53. NGO “Community Development Fund”
54. NGO Center “Family”
55. NGO “Yustyna”
56. NGO Personal Development Hub “TRY KOTE”
57. NGO “COMMUNITY LEAGUE”
58. Institute for Social Research and Political Analysis
59. NGO Community Development Agency “Intonatsia ZMIN”
60. NGO “Bereznivska BRAMA”
61. Editor’s Office of “Slovo Pravdy” newspaper
62. NGO “Donetsk Press Club”
63. NGO “Peremoha”
64. NGO “Yustyna”
65. NGO “Union of Konotop Community”
66. NGO “MARTIN-club”
67. IDP Initiative in Koziatyn
68. Coalition “On the Contact Line”
69. NGO “Strong Communities”
70. NGO “UA group”
71. NGO “Committee of Voters of Ukraine”
72. Municipal Non-Commercial Enterprise “Vyzhnytsia City Hospital”
73. NGO “Horizon of Changes”
74. Public Alliance “Political Action of Women”
75. NGO “SLID”
76. NGO “August Virlych Foundation”
77. Municipal Non-Commercial Enterprise “Novoselytsia Hospital”
78. NGO “Barrier-Free Ternopil”
79. NGO “Mist 3.10”
80. NGO “Dobro Time”
81. Koriukivka City Youth NGO “Alternative”
82. NGO “Together to a Successful Business”
83. NGO “New Kalyta”
84. NGO “Podil Legal League”
85. NGO Carpathian Human Rights Agency “WESTED”
86. NGO Chernihiv Educational Center “Initiative”
87. NGO “Odesa Institute of Social Technologies”
88. NGO “Center for Community Development”, Kharkiv
89. NGO Advocacy and Analytics Platform “Chas Hromad”
90. NGO “HILFE”
91. NGO “Women’s Anti-Corruption Movement”
92. NGO “Laboratory of Culture Research”
93. NGO “Ukrainian Youth Club”
94. Odesa Regional Organization of VGO “Committee of Voters of Ukraine”
95. All-Ukrainian NGO “Association for the Promotion of Self-Organization of the Population”
96. NGO “Innovative Bukovyna Fund”
97. NGO “Civil Society Development Forum”
98. Society “Ukrainian National House in Chernivtsi”
99. NGO “Agency for Regional Development of Prybuzhzhia”
100. NGO “Chernivtsi Regional Society of Children of Political Prisoners and Repressed “HEIRS”
101. Chernivtsi Association “Zakhyst”
102. NGO Civic Center “New Generation”
103. NGO “Mykolaiv City Development Fund”
104. NGO Center of Development of Communities “Idea. Action. Result”
105. NGO Regional Development Centre “Top-Kaya”
106. Khmelnytskyi District Public Organization “PRAVO”
107. NGO “Media Development Fund”
108. NGO “Volunteer Movement of Bukovyna”
109. NGO “Open Data Association”
110. Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation PAUCI
111. CO “Zhytomyr Community Foundation”
112. NGO “Lab for Democratic Transformations”
113. NGO “Lyuk Media Group”
114. NGO “Transcarpathian Public Centre”
115. NGO “Institute of Transborder Initiatives”
116. NGO “Make Sense”
117. NGO “Training and Consulting Center for Access to Information”
118. Rivne Regional Organization of the All-Ukrainian Civil Organisation “Civil Network OPORA”
119. NGO “Proryv-Misto”
120. NGO “Youth Space of Drohobych”
121. PO “Innovation Action”
122. NGO “Psychability”
123. Centre for Social Capital Development
124. All-Ukrainian NGO “Association for Community Self-Organization Assistance”
125. NGO “Center for Political Studies”
126. Czech Humanitarian and Human Rights Organisation “People in Need”
127. NGO “Power of the Future”
128. NGO “We Are from Kharkiv!”
129. International Charity Fund “Indifferent”
130. Charitable Fund of Social Reforms and Support “Hope”
131. Voznesensk Association “Our Town”
132. NGO “KOMROZ”
133. PO “Dnipropetrovsk Regional Youth Council”
134. Berdychiv City Youth NGO “Youth Chooses Life”
135. NGO “Media East”
136. PO “Mariupol Association of Entrepreneurs”
137. CO Charity Fund “Rodina LG”
138. PO Union of People with Disabilities “Perspective”
139. CO Charitable Fund “Help Donbas Battalion”
140. Public Union “First Kharkiv Humanitarian Hub”
141. Future Development Agency
142. PO “Sustainable Development of the State”
143. PO Association “Revival and Development”
144. PO “Space for Positive Change”
145. Kryvyi Rih Society of Political Prisoners and Victims of Repression
146. NGO “Agency of City Initiatives”
147. Civil Association “The League of the Strong”
148. PO “Educational and Analytical Center of Community Development”
149. NGO Cherkashchy Umanshchyny
150. NGO Dream in Action
151. PO “SIM Legal and Political Research Center”
152. Ukrainian Education Platform
153. PO “Safe Birth”
154. PO “Accessible Cinema”
155. Black Sea Center for Political and Social Research
156. PO “U-Generation”
157. Regional Development Agency of Volyn Oblast
158. Transparency International Ukraine
159. Vinnytsia Regional Organization of the All-Ukrainian Union of People with Disabilities “USI”
160. NGO “BikeIntegration”

Individual signees:

Romaliiska Maryna

Pustova Olena

Bediak Halyna Mykolaiivna

Halak Oksana

Mikhno Viktoriia Oleksandrivna

Pokhno Oksana

Bikla Olena Volodymyrivna

Libova Inna Andriivna

Libov Volodymyr Abramovych

Dolhopolova Yuliia Petrivna

Rakocha Maia Ivanivna

Bondarenko Anastasia

Kovalenko Svitlana Mykolaiivna

Vashchuk-Ohdanska Oksana

To the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelenskyy 

Dear Mr. President!

At the beginning of September, after a reshuffle in the Government, information emerged about the intention to “liquidate” the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories (MinReintegration) and to exercise some of its powers by the Ministry of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure of Ukraine (MinRegion). Despite the absence of an official position of the Government, some statements by government officials suggest that the systemic reintegration policy is being discontinued and that these powers are being dispersed among different authorities.

We, the representatives of national non-governmental and international organisations, believe that the decision to liquidate the MinReintegration is premature. It can lead to negative consequences. First and foremost, it is a signal to both Ukrainians and our partners that Ukraine is not ready to work on regaining control over the currently occupied territories, protecting people affected by Russian aggression and restoring justice.

The Peace Formula you have proposed is not only for the international community, it also requires Ukraine’s leadership in its implementation at home. The liberation of parts of the Kharkiv and Kherson regions has demonstrated that overcoming the consequences of the occupation, ensuring the restoration of power and life in the territories that have been occupied for less than a year, requires significant efforts on the part of the state and its partners. Without a systematic reintegration policy, it will not be possible to implement such points of the Peace Formula as “Restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity”, “Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities”, “Restoration of justice”, “Confirmation of the end of the war”. Without regaining control over the currently occupied territories, it will not be possible to return forcibly displaced children and release civilian hostages held in illegal prisons in the occupied territories of Ukraine and in the territory of the RF.

So far, it is the MinReintegration that has been responsible for a wide range of powers related to overcoming the consequences of the war: from coordinating the evacuation of the population from the frontline areas to supporting the families of political prisoners and maintaining communication with Ukrainians in the TOT. Obviously, not all of the currently defined powers of the MinReintegration can and should be implemented by MinRegion. Of course, the support, development and further restoration of the de-occupied territories of Ukraine should be carried out in a single logic of Ukraine’s development and restoration of all territories affected by the armed aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, there is a high risk of losing some of the powers over people affected by the armed aggression against Ukraine if the Government does not have a ministry directly responsible for developing a coherent policy.

We urge you, dear Mr. President, to support the retention in the Government of the ministry responsible for people affected by the war – regardless of where they are: in the occupied territories, inside the country or abroad. You mentioned this in October 2019 at the Unity Forum in Mariupol, and people-centred policies should remain in the spotlight. True national unity is only possible when all those affected by the war have a voice and protection from their state. A possible way to restart the MinReintegration could be to transform it into the Ministry of National Unity, which would ensure that the national dimension of the Peace Formula is fully implemented.

September 25, 2024

CF “EAST-SOS”

Human Rights Centre ZMINA

NGO “Donbas SOS”

NGO “CrimeaSOS”

NGO “Civil Holding GROUP OF INFLUENCE”

CF “Right to Protection”

CF “Stabilization Support Services”

NGO “School for Policy Analysis”

Crimean Human Rights Group

Coalition “On the Contact Line”

NGO “Crimean Process”

NGO “Stehzyna dodomu”

CF  “Foundation Volunteers without borders”

NGO “Zlagoda STAR”

NGO “Kolo yednosti”

NGO “Ukraine.Time to Unite”

NGO “Space of womyn’s opportunities ACTIVEL”

NGO “My Indeependent Country” (MIC)

NGO “Public initiatives “Alliance

NGO “Our souls are not indifferent”

NGO Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR), National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion 

NGO “Driada”

Media Initiative for Human Rights

Public Union “Human Rights House Crimea”

NGO “Centre of civil education “Almenda”

NGO “Institute of Peace and Common Ground”

NGO “Blue Bird”

NGO “Foundation for Fundamental Research”

NGO “Youth Center for Regional Development” 

CO “CF “Bratslavska hromada”

NGO “TRYZVUK”

NGO “Parents’ Association “Ray of Hope”

NGO “Donbas Internally Displaced Persons Association “Dobrotvor” 

NGO “Shlach dobra”

NGO “United Veterans Movement “Interaction”

Mediation and Dialogue Research Center, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

NGO “Odessa Regional Group of Mediation”

NGO “TROI”

CO “Chyhyryn district development fund”

NGO “Human Rights Platform”

NGO “Social Action Centre”

NGO “Free Country Communities” 

IG Khmilnyk

Regional Center for Human Rights

NGO “Academy of Strategic Studies”

NGO “Access Point”

NGO “Spilno HUB

Public organization “Litay”

Kharkiv Institute for Social Research (KhISR)

NGO “Center for Civil Initiatives «Donbas»

DIYA Human Rights Center

NGO “EGIDA-CENTRE”

CU “Educational Human Rights Hiuse – Chernihiv” 

NGO “Student Youth of Bahmut”

NGO Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group

In early September, after a reshuffle in the Government, information emerged about the intention to “integrate” the Ministry for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine (MinReintegration) into the Ministry for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure of Ukraine (MinRegion). Despite the absence of an official position of the Government, public statements of government officials allow us to conclude that, in fact, this means the merger of the MinReintegration and the inclusion of the issue of the temporarily occupied territories (TOT) of Ukraine in the powers of the Ministry responsible for regional policy of Ukraine, and the redistribution among different ministries of those functions of the MinReintegration that cannot be included in the powers of the MinRegion. 

Such a position may be understandable since support, development, and further restoration of the TOT of Ukraine should take place in a single logic of Ukraine’s development and restoration of all territories affected by the armed aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, there is a high risk of losing some of the powers over people affected by the armed aggression against Ukraine if the Government does not have a ministry directly responsible for developing a comprehensive policy of reintegration of the TOT and de-occupied territories of Ukraine. The redistribution of the functions of the MinReintegration may lead to the disappearance of the topic of protecting the rights of victims from the state’s agenda, as the restoration of infrastructure in the regions is only part of a more comprehensive reintegration process that includes legal, humanitarian, and socio-economic aspects. But the main thing is the support of people.

We, the representatives of organisations dealing with the protection of the rights of victims of the armed aggression against Ukraine, consider it extremely necessary when implementing the decision to redistribute the powers of the MinReintegration to take into account a range of issues related to the protection and restoration of the rights of the affected population and the development and implementation of a comprehensive state policy of reintegration of the TOT of Ukraine. The reasons and mechanism for the redistribution of the functions of the MinReintegration among other ministries, mainly the MinRegion, should be communicated and explained to the public.  

Currently, the MinReintegration has a wide range of responsibilities related to overcoming the negative consequences of the war. In particular, it ensures the formation and implementation of the state policy on IDPs and those who have left abroad as a result of the war; Ukraine’s compliance with international humanitarian law; coordination of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population; restoration and building peace; assistance in meeting the socio-economic, environmental, informational and cultural needs of the population living in the TOT and adjacent territories; etc. The MinReintegration ensures the coordination of evacuation of the population from the TOT and the territories of hostilities. In addition, the MinReintegration, on the basis of the state enterprise “Ukrainian National Centre for Peacebuilding”, operates the National Information Bureau (NIB), which, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, collects, summarises, and transmits information about persons who died, went missing, were deported or taken prisoner during the armed conflict. But most importantly, the MinReintegration is the body that coordinates other central executive authorities in matters related to the protection of the rights of the affected population and the development of a reintegration policy of the TOT of Ukraine.

Clearly, not all of the above can and should be implemented by the MinRegion. Therefore, the main warning of the redistribution of powers of the MinReintegration is the risk that the problems of protecting and implementing the rights of those affected by the war will disappear from the state’s agenda. We are already experiencing the consequences of the loss of leadership of the MinReintegration – the Government has been considering the Draft Strategy for Restoring State Power and Reintegrating the Population of the De-occupied Territories for the period up to 2026 and the corresponding operational plan for its implementation for more than a month. However, the adoption of this important document, as well as other important strategic documents, has been put on hold.

Taking into account the general vector of the state policy on de-occupation and reintegration of the Ukrainian territories currently occupied, overcoming the consequences of the Russian Federation’s aggression, we call on the Government to ensure the functioning of the authority that will have the powers to protect the rights of the affected population and develop a comprehensive and systematic policy of reintegration of the TOT of Ukraine. This can happen, for example, through the transformation of the MinReintegration into the Ministry of Unity with basic powers over persons affected by the armed aggression against Ukraine. Alternatively, the Government may retain the post of Vice Prime Minister for the Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine (without a ministry) with specialised deputies in each ministry, as the interests of the affected population and reintegration are cross-cutting and should be taken into account in all areas, from education to the energy industry.

We believe that maintaining the direction of reintegration of the TOT of Ukraine, supporting and ensuring the rights of victims of armed aggression in the Government are critically important. That is why preserving the institutional capacity to respond to and overcome the negative consequences of the war and occupation, as well as to build strategies for the future, is essential for the further development of our country.

September 18, 2024

Human Rights Centre ZMINA

Crimean Human Rights Group

NGO “Donbas SOS”

Civil Holding “GROUP OF INFLUENCE”

Charitable Foundation “EAST-SOS”

Charitable Fund “Right to Protection”

Charitable Foundation “Stabilization Support Services”

NGO “CrimeaSOS”